The reform of the Belgian federal administration 10 years on : what balance has been achieved between operational autonomy of top managers and the supervision carried out by the horizontal ministerial departments?
By: VISSCHER, Christian de
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Contributor(s): RANDOUR, François.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Los Angeles : SAGE, Mar. 2014Subject(s): Reforma Administrativa | Alta Administração Pública | Gestão Orçamentária | Gestão de Pessoas | Avaliação de DesempenhoOnline resources: Acesso | Acesso International Review of Administrative Sciences 80, 1, p. 33-51Abstract: In the wake of the Copernic reform, Belgiums senior federal civil servants are now appointed for a fixed term and guided on performance via management plans. This article sets out to assess the impact of the introduction of the fixed-term system on the autonomy of senior civil servants with regard to the horizontal departments responsible for the budget, on the one hand, and human resources, on the other hand, within Belgiums federal administration. Based on the so-called inconsistencies approach, the article focuses briefly on three inconsistencies: internal, discursive and contextual. An analysis of these inconsistencies confirms one of the forms of cheating in the relationship between ministers and senior civil servants formulated by Hood and Lodge (2006), namely that the first can be inclined to reduce the margin of discretion of the latter by maintaining formal or informal mechanisms to exercise control over the provision of resources
In the wake of the Copernic reform, Belgiums senior federal civil servants are now appointed for a fixed term and guided on performance via management plans. This article sets out to assess the impact of the introduction of the fixed-term system on the autonomy of senior civil servants with regard to the horizontal departments responsible for the budget, on the one hand, and human resources, on the other hand, within Belgiums federal administration. Based on the so-called inconsistencies approach, the article focuses briefly on three inconsistencies: internal, discursive and contextual. An analysis of these inconsistencies confirms one of the forms of cheating in the relationship between ministers and senior civil servants formulated by Hood and Lodge (2006), namely that the first can be inclined to reduce the margin of discretion of the latter by maintaining formal or informal mechanisms to exercise control over the provision of resources
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